Failing Companies and the Antitrust Laws by McDavid, Janet L.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 14
1981 
Failing Companies and the Antitrust Laws 
Janet L. McDavid 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Courts Commons, and the Legislation 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Janet L. McDavid, Failing Companies and the Antitrust Laws, 14 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 229 (1981). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol14/iss2/7 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
FAILING COMPANIES AND THE 
ANTITRUST LAWS 
Janet L. McDavid* 
This is a period of uncertainty for the American economy gen-
erally, and for American business in particular. The nation has 
been suffering under double-digit inflation for several years;1 un-
employment is high and expected to increase;2 overall corporate 
profits have declined;8 and several major corporations have sus-
tained record losses. 4 
The law reacts to such economic difficulties in different ways. 
In the area of antitrust law, the courts have been willing to give 
special consideration to financially-troubled companies. Failing 
companies, under certain circumstances, have been allowed to 
engage in conduct that, if done by a healthy corporation, would 
constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. Several rationales for 
this special treatment exist. The first is the belief that competi-
tion may be promoted, or at least not adversely affected, if ar-
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.A., 1971, Northwestern University; J.D., 
1974, Georgetown University. 
' According to the United States Department of Labor, prices for finished goods in-
creased 1. 7 % in July, 1980, for a compounded annual rate of 22.4 % . Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 
1980, at 3, col l; BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 1, 1980, at 16. The consumer price index for 1980 
rose 12.4%, only slightly better than the 13.3% increase for 1979. Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 
1981, at 3, col 1. 
• Between May and August, 1980, the unemployment rate ranged between 7.6 and 
7.8%. Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1980, at 3, col. 1. . 
• According to a United States Department of Commerce report, corporate profits de-
clined 18.2% in the second quarter of 1980. Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1980, at 3, col. 1. In 
July, 1980, factories operated at 74.2% of capacity, the lowest rate in five years. Wall St. 
J., Aug. 19, 1980, at 3, col 1. 
• The American automobile manufacturers all sustained record losses in 1980: General 
Motors, $762.5 million, Ford Motor Co., $1.54 billion, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1981, at 4, col. 
2; American Motors, $197.5 million, Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1981, at 8, col. 2. Chrysler Cor-
poration lost $1.7 billion, the largest annual loss in United States corporate history. Wall 
St. J., March 2, 1981, at 3, col. 1. Chrysler exists today only because the federal govern-
ment approved a $1.5 billion guaranteed loan. Chrysler Corp. Loan Guarantee Act of 
1979, P.L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (1979). For a general discussion of Chrysler's 
financial condition, and the effect of its potential bankruptcy, see H.R. REP. No. 96-690, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10, reprinted in (1979) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2787, 2789-
91. Since January 1, 1979, Chrysler has eliminated 15,000 jobs and closed half a dozen 
plants. Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1980, at 3, col. 1. 
During its fourth quarter, United States Steel Corp. lost $561.7 million, one of the 
biggest quarterly net losses ever for an American corporation. Id. at 3, col. 3. U.S. Steel 
has closed 15 unprofitable plants and eliminated 10,000 jobs. Id. 
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guably unlawful conduct permits a marginal competitor to re-
main in the market. Similarly, the courts theorize that the 
acquisition of a failing company may not result in the lessening 
of competition that might result from a merger of two profitable 
, companies. Finally, the courts also are aware of the social conse-
quences of business failure. 
This article will examine two areas in which the courts have 
given financially-troubled companies special treatment under 
the antitrust laws. Part I discusses the acquisition of a failing 
company, which may constitute a judicially-created exemption 
from section 7 of the Clayton Act.11 Part II considers certain 
cases involving failing companies whose conduct is challenged 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 6 
I. MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND THE FAILING COMPANY 
DOCTRINE 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part that 
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, di-
rectly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock 
. . . or the whole or any part of the assets of another cor-
poration engaged also in commerce, where in any line of 
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such 
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or 
to tend to create a monopoly.7 
The courts have interpreted section 7 to apply to horizontal,8 
vertical,9 and, to some extent, conglomerate mergers,1° as well as 
• 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1976). 
8 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1976). 
7 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1976). 
8 Section 7 applies to horizontal mergers, that is, mergers between competitors. See, 
e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (merger of grocery chains 
with combined market share of 7.5% unlawful where there was a trend toward concen-
tration); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (merger of two 
commercial banks with a combined market share of 30% illegal in a concentrated mar-
ket); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (structure and history of 
industry, barriers to entry, concentration, and market shares must be considered in eval-
uating merger of shoe manufacturer with retail chain of shoe stores having some manu-
facturing capability). 
• Section 7 also applies to vertical mergers, that is, mergers between suppliers and 
customers. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972) (automobile 
manufacturer's acquisition of supplier of spark plugs and batteries); Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (merger between shoe manufacturer and retail shoe 
store chain); United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (auto-
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to joint ventures.11 In addition, challenges to mergers are possi-
ble under section 1 of the Sherman Act12 or section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act.18 The "failing company doctrine" is 
a defense to such actions. 
A. Judicial Interpretation of the Failing Company Doctrine: 
Elements of the Defense. 
The "failing company doctrine" is a judicially created defense, 
sanctioned by Congress,1' to actions challenging otherwise un-
mobile paint manufacturer held 23% of stock of General Motors). 
•• Several varieties of conglomerate mergers exist, including product extension merg-
ers, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (manufacturer of detergents ac-
quired bleach manufacturers), and market extension mergers, United States v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd mem. sub nom. Bartlett v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971) (merger between copper company and oil company which 
might have entered copper industry). The courts condemn conglomerate mergers because 
they may prevent a potential entrant from entering a market, e.g., Procter & Gamble, or 
because they create a danger of reciprocal buying, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 
380 U.S. 592 (1965). Proposals have emerged to impose limitations on acquisitions be-
tween major corporations on the ground that mere size and concentration of assets may 
be undesirable. See, e.g., (1980) 951 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-4; (1979] 
925 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-21 (proposed legislation to prevent oil com-
pany acquisitions); (1979] 921 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-22 (FTC staff 
proposals); (1979] 902 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-17 (FTC Commissioner 
Pitofsky favors tougher merger standards for large firms); (1979] 895 ANTITRUST & 
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-5 (Justice Department proposal to prevent acquisitions by 
major corporations). The FTC recently rejected a staff recommendation that it adopt a 
trade regulation rule concerning the standards of proof applicable in potential competi-
tion merger cases before the FTC. (1980] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 50,419. 
11 See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (joint venture by 
two companies illegal where either might have entered the market separately). 
,. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
•• Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides in pertinent part, "(u]nfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1976). Mergers can be 
unlawful under Section 5. See In re Dean Foods Co., 70 F.T.C. 1146 (1966), modified, 
395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1967); In re Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962). Courts 
have held that every violation of§ 7 is also a violation of§ 5. See, e.g., Stanley Works v. 
FTC, 469 F.2d 498,499 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973). The Fourth 
Circuit recently found, however, that a merger may not be enjoined solely under § 5. 
FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 291-92 n.l (4th Cir. 1977). 
" The Senate Report on the 1950 amendments to § 7 stated: 
The argument has been made that the proposed bill, if passed, would have the 
effect of preventing a company which is in a failing or bankrupt condition from 
selling out. 
The committee are [sic] in full accord with the proposition that any firm in 
such a condition should be free to dispose of its stock or assets. The committee, 
however, do [sic] not believe that the proposed bill will prevent sales of this 
type. 
The judicial interpretation on this point goes back many years and is abun-
dantly clear. According to decisions of the Supreme Court, the Clayton Act does 
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lawful mergers or acquisitions.1& The Supreme Court first articu-
lated the doctrine in International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 16 which in-
volved a horizontal merger between two shoe manufacturers. 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had found that the 
merger violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, but the Supreme 
Court reversed on two grounds. First, the Court found that the 
parties to the merger competed in separate markets, and that 
the merger would not substantially lessen competition.17 The 
second basis for reversal was that the acquired company faced 
"financial ruin".18 The Court postulated two rationales for the 
creation of the doctrine. The first emphasized the social conse-
quences of business failure, noting the adverse impact on stock-
holders, creditors, employees, and others. The second rationale 
assumed that little lessening of competition would occur if a cor-
poration that otherwise would fail was acquired even by a 
competitor. 
Under the traditional formulation of the failing company doc-
not apply in bankruptcy or receivership cases. Moreover, the Court has held, 
with respect to this specific section, that a company does not have to be actually 
in a state of bankruptcy to be exempt from its provisions; it is sufficient that it is 
heading in that direction with the probability that bankruptcy will ensue. 
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1950) U. S. ConE CONG. SERV. 
4293, 4299; accord, H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949). 
ia The failing company doctrine is applicable to mergers challenged under either § 7 or 
§ 5. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (§ 7); United 
States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970) (§ 5). Some dispute has arisen, 
however, concerning the extent to which the doctrine is applicable to mergers challenged 
under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Compare American Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 F. 
91, 93-94 (7th Cir. 1917) (acquisition of failing company does not violate § 1 of Sherman 
Act) with Bowl America, Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1080, 1092-93 (D. Md. 
1969) (doctrine inapplicable to mergers challenged under § 1). 
18 280 U.S. 291 (1930). An earlier version of the failing company doctrine was the basis 
for a 1917 circuit court decision permitting the acquisition of a failing company in an 
action under § 1 of the Sherman Act. American Press Ass'n v. United States, 245 F. 91 
(7th Cir. 1917). 
" 280 U.S. at 298-99. 
'" The Court stated: 
In the light of the case thus disclosed of a corporation with resources so depleted 
and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it faced the grave probability 
of a business failure with resulting loss to its stockholders and injury to the com-
munities where its plants were operated, we hold that the purchase of its capital 
stock by a competitor (there being no other prospective purchaser), not with a 
purpose to lessen competition, but to facilitate the accumulated business of the 
purchaser and with the effect of mitigating seriously injurious consequences oth-
erwise probable, is not in contemplation of law prejudicial to the public and does 
not substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce within the intent of 
the Clayton Act. 
Id. at 302. For a discussion of the financial condition of the acquired company in Inter-
national Shoe, see Blum, The Failing Company Doctrine, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. 
REV. 75, 76-81 (1974). . 
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trine, the acquiring company must prove two elements: (1) the 
probability of imminent business failure or the target company 
and (2) the unavailability of other purchasers with less anticom-
petitive impact.18 Because the doctrine is an exception to the 
general rules governing acquisitions, the courts have construed 
the requirements of the defense narrowly. The failing company 
doctrine is apparently an affirmative defense, and the parties to 
the acquisition bear the burden of proving that these conditions 
have been satisfied. 10 
1. "Imminent business failure" - The requirement of immi-
nent business failure has been the subject of extensive judicial 
interpretation. The courts have interpreted strictly the Interna-
tional Shoe requirement of "grave probability of business fail-
ure." Courts have not been convinced that business failure is im-
minent when a company continues to be profitable,u is solvent,22 
or has prospects of showing a profit. H Likewise, a showing that 
management of a viable company intends to go out of business 
or liquidate,14 or that a company has either declining profits or 
large losses,u is badly managed,H lacks capital for moderniza-
" See, e.g., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971) (ac-
quisition by newspaper of printing company that was profitable, but which owners chose 
to sell rather than modernize). 
10 See text accompanying notes 156-62 infra. See also Citizen Publishing Co. v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1969). 
"' United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971). 
11 FTC v. Food Town Stores, 539 F.2d 1339, 1345 (4th Cir. 1976) (company had sub-
stantial short-term liabilities, but was solvent and operated at a profit); United States v. 
Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994, 999-1000 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (company with large 
losses was solvent and could obtain credit). 
•• In re Papercraft Corp., 78 F.T.C. 1352, 1406-08 (1971) (company had operating 
losses and management problems, but had significant sales and assets). 
" See, e.g., Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 1961) (owners 
of profitable sand company, which was a going concern; wanted to liquidate); United 
States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1258-60 (C.D. Cal. 1973), a{f'd per 
curiam, 418 U.S. 906 (1974) (parts of acquired company were profitable; intention to go 
out of business irrelevant) . 
.. See, e.g., Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 133, 137 (1969); F & 
M Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814, 817 (2d Cir. 1979) (large 
losses and declining sales, but company was rebuilding with support of creditors); United 
States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994, 999-1000 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (declining mar-
ket share and sales, but company had substantial assets and sound credit rating); cf. In 
re Dean Foods Co., 70 F.T.C. 1146, 1272-84 (1966) (company with declining sales, but 
was able to meet its short-term debts and had operating profit; was not failing). 
11 United States v. American Technical Industries, Inc., (1974] TRADE CAB. (CCH) ,r 
74,873 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (negative cash balance and liabilities exceeded assets, but com-
pany operated at a profit in most years); cf. Crown-Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 
800, 831 (9th Cir. 1961) (death of key officer involved in attempt to rehabilitate 
company). 
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tion, 27 or has obsolete facilities is insufficient to prove this ele-
ment of the def enS'e. 28 However, the fact that a company is in 
bankruptcy or imminent danger of bankruptcy, or is unable to 
pay its debts as they mature, appears to satisfy the requirement 
of probable business failure.29 Thus, the courts have required 
that defendants show a strong likelihood of business failure. 
The courts' emphasis on evidence of failure seems entirely ap-
propriate. Many businesses experience periods of decline with-
out ever facing any real prospect of bankruptcy. 30 Thus, the 
courts have properly attempted to distinguish financially-troub-
led companies from failing companies, although in some cases 
such a distinction may be difficult to draw. As long as any rea-
sonable possibility exists that a company can be rehabilitated, 
the courts should not permit an anticompetitive acquisition. 
2. No other available purchasers- The requirement that 
there be no other available purchasers has been the subject of 
less judicial interpretation than the imminent business failure 
requirement. Presumably the requirement is imposed to satisfy 
the court that less anticompetitive alternatives to the otherwise 
unlawful acquisition are unavailable. Thus, courts have required 
that the failing company actively seek alternative purchasers. 81 
As one court stated, the failing company must show that it "un-
dertook a well conceived and thorough canvass of the industry 
.., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971). 
18 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Dean 
Foods Co., 70 F.T.C. 1146, 1280-81 (1966), modified, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968). 
" See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 606 (6th Cir. 1970); 
United States v. Culbro Corp., (1980-81) TRADE CAS. (CCH) ,i 63,692 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); 
United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 779-81 (D. Md. 1976); 
United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 98-101 (D. Colo. 1975); National Tea Co., 
69 F.T.C. 226, 261, 366 (1966). 
00 Although Ford Motor Company has sustained record losses recently, few would sug-
. gest that Ford is a failing company. See note 4 supra. Ford presumably has the resources 
necessary to reverse its recent losses. Therefore, Ford's acquisition by a competitor or a 
potential entrant into the automobile industry would damage competition. If, however, 
Ford, like Chrysler, were to sustain such losses for a number of consecutive years, and 
were burdened with obsolete facilities which it was unable to rehabilitate without sub-
stantial capital expenditures, the courts might regard Ford as a failing company. Faced 
with the alternative of bankruptcy or merger,- a court might permit Ford to be acquired 
in an otherwise unlawful acquisition. 
•• See, e.g., United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 556 (1971); 
Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 
U.S. 918 (1973); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 781-82 (D. 
Md. 1976); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 101-02 (D. Colo. 1975); In re 
Retail Credit Co., (1976-79 Transfer. Binder] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 21,446 (FTC 
1978). But see United States v. Culbro Corp., (1980-81) TRADE CAS. (CCH) ,i 63,692 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (financial difficulties well-known, but no other offer was made). 
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such as to ferret out viable alternative partners for a merger."81 
One failing company, for example, was held not to have made an 
adequate effort where it had failed to utilize the services of an 
investment banker to attempt to locate other potential 
purchasers. 33 
Indeed, it would be desirable if the courts required the failing 
company to prove that no company outside of the industry 
would consider the acquisition, although such proof would be 
difficult. From the standpoint of promoting or preserving com-
petition, a purchaser from outside the industry who would be 
unlikely to enter the industry absent the acquisition would be 
most desirable. The next best alternative would be a potential 
entrant, while an acquisition by another competitor would be 
least desirable. By forcing the failing company to make a dili-
gent search for an alternative purchaser, this requirement per-
mits the courts to attempt to minimize the anticompetitive ef- . 
feet of an acquisition. 
3. Dim prospects of reorganization- Courts also have dis-
cussed requirements other than the two set forth in Interna-
tional Shoe. In 1969, in Citizens Publishing Co. v. United 
States, 34 the Supreme Court implied that inability to reorganize 
a failing company under the bankruptcy laws might be a third 
requirement of the failing company doctrine. Later Supreme 
Court decisions, however, omit any reference to the reorganiza-
tion possibility as a third requirement, 311 and the few lower 
courts that have considered the issue are divided.38 
11 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 296 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (E.D. Wis. 1969) . 
.. Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen, 348 F. Supp. 606, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd on 
other grounds, 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976). 
"' 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969). Citizen Publishing involved an unlawful joint operating 
agreement between two newspapers. Following the Supreme Court's decision, Congress 
passed the Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1976), which was 
designed to overrule Citizen Publishing. The Act created an antitrust exemption for 
other · existing joint operating agreements. It also permits future joint operating agree-
ments if one of the newspapers is "in probable danger of business failure" and the Attor-
ney General determines that such an arrangement would effectuate the policy and pur-
pose of the Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1802(5), 1803(b) (1976). 
16 See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974); United 
States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971) . 
.. Compare United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 606 n.30 (6th Cir. 1970) 
and United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1259 (C.D. Cal. 1973), 
aff'd per curiam, 418 U.S. 906 (1974) (dictum) with United States v. Black & Decker 
Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 778 (D. Md. 1976) (dictum) and United States v. M.P.M., 
Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 96 (D. Colo. 1975). In one recent case, United States v. Culbro 
Corp., [1980-81) TRADE CAS. (CCH) 'II 63,692 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), unsuccessful attempts had 
been made to reorganize the failing company under Chapter XI, and unless the acquisi-
tion took place it would be liquidated. 
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Until the Supreme Court hands down a definitive decision, the 
issue will remain unresolved. The possibility of reorganization 
should be a factor only in those cases where a healthy competi-
tor is likely to emerge. Arguably, if a company can be reorga-
nized successfully, it may never have been actually failing. Reor-
ganization also might be viewed as an alternative to the "no 
other purchaser" requirement.87 Clearly, successful reorganiza-
tion is preferable to an anticompetitive acquisition because reor-
ganization both preserves the competitor and prevents an in-
crease in concentration. However, to predict whether a company 
can be reorganized successfully is difficult. Refusing to permit 
the acquisition of a failing company because there is some possi-
bility that it could be reorganized seems extreme and unwise. An 
unsuccessful reorganization serves neither competition nor soci-
ety. Such a policy completely ignores the social effects of busi-
ness failure which the courts should consider, even though such 
effects are not of primary importance. 
4. The failing division or subsidiary- The extent to which 
the failing company doctrine applies to a failing division or sub-
sidiary of an otherwise profitable, viable corporation, is quite 
controversial. The question has received little attention in judi-
cial decisions, and what little case law exists is divided. 88 
B. Administrative Interpretation of the Failing Company 
Defense 
In addition to being asserted as a defense to actions under 
section 7, merging companies often raise the failing company 
doctrine in pre-enforcement review proceedings before the De-
partment of Justice Antitrust Division and the FTC.89 These ad-
., In United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 96 (D. Colo. 1975), the court 
concluded that reorganization waa an alternative to the "no other purchaser" require-
ment of the doctrine. 
aa Compare United States v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 274 F. Supp. 573, 584 n.1 (W.D. 
Okla. 1967) (dictum suggesting the doctrine applies to failing subsidiaries) with United 
States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 538, 550 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (failing division not 
within doctrine) and United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1260 
(C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 418 U.S. 906 (1974) (doctrine inapplicable to profita-
ble company with failing division). In United States v. Lever Brothers Co., 216 F. Supp. 
887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), the court permitted the sale of a failing brand of detergent to a 
competitor. 
aa The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (Supp. 
III 1979), requires premerger notification filings with both agencies at least 30 days prior 
to the consummation of certain acquisitions. In addition, the FTC provides advisory 
opinions on certain transactions, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 et seq. (1980), and the Justice Depart-
ment ofl'ers a "business review procedure," 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1980). The Justice Depart-
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ministrative agency interpretations of the failing company de-
fense can often differ significantly from those of the courts. 
1. "Imminent business failure"- As described in recent tes-
timony before a congressional committee,'0 the two federal anti-
trust enforcement agencies appear to approach the issue of im-
minent business failure in a similar manner. Both agencies 
conduct a detailed investigation of the financial condition of the 
parties.'1 For example, the Antitrust Division obtains informa-
tion from creditors and other financial institutions, trade as-
sociations, and other firms in the industry.411 The FTC analysis 
typically includes examination of trends in financial statements, 
profitability, liquidity, a comparison with other firms in the in-
dustry, and the company's efficiency.'8 The two agencies appear 
to differ, however, in the extent to which they are willing to ac-
cept the defense, although there is no clear explanation or justi-
fication for those differences." 
2. No other available purchaser-~ike the courts, the Jus-
tice Department and the FTC consider whether the acquiring 
company is the only available purchaser. The Department looks 
for "a bona fide attempt to find a less anticompetitive purchaser, 
such as the use of an investment banker or extensive search."" 
It prefers that this search be conducted prior to negotiating an 
otherwise unlawful merger.'8 The FTC views a lower offer from a 
ment's Merger Guidelines provide that a merger ordinarily will not be challenged "if . . . 
the firm faces the clear probability of business failure .... " [1980) 1 TRADE REG. REP. 
(CCH) 11 4510. 
•• Hearings on the Failing Company Defense Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Mo-
nopoly and Business Rights of the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Failing Company Hearings]. Assistant Attorney General John 
Shenefield testified on behalf of the Department of Justice, and Daniel C. Schwartz, 
Deputy Director of the FTC Bureau of Competition, testified on behalf of the FTC . 
., Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 34 (testimony of John Shenefield); id. 
at 48-49 (testimony of Daniel C. Schwartz) . 
.. Id. at 34 (testimony of John Shenefield). 
41 Id. at 48-49 (testimony of Daniel C. Schwartz). 
•• According to Shenefield, in the period 1975-78, 22 companies raised the defense 
before the Justice Department, which accepted it in 17 cases. Failing Company Hear-
ings, supra note 40, at 18 (testimony of John Shenefield). In contrast, an average of six 
companies per year raise the defense before the FTC. Id. at 44 (testimony of Daniel C. 
Schwartz). Most, however, are found not to be failing. Id. at 49. 
•• Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 31 (testimony of John Shenefield). 
For example, in one instance the Department required the failing company to consider 
"any good faith offer from any company capable of operating ... [the failing company] 
as a viable competitive entity regardless of how that offer compared to the present [out-
standing] offer." Dept. of Justice Business Review Letter to Motorola, Inc., reprinted in 
5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 50,209 (1974). The acquisition was approved after an invest-
ment banker contacted thirty-eight alternative purchasers who expressed no interest in 
the acquisition and two more anticompetitive offers had been received. Id. at 11 50,212. 
•• Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 32 (testimony of John Shenefield). 
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less anticompetitive purchaser as preferable to a higher offer 
from a competitor, who probably is willing to pay a premium to 
increase its market share.47 The FTC also regards community 
and employee groups as alternatives to acquisition by a 
competitor. 48 
3. Dim prospects of reorganization- The Justice Depart-
ment and the FTC have taken somewhat different positions on 
the question whether it must be proved that the failing company 
could not be reorganized. The Antitrust Division recognizes the 
uncertainties present in attempted reorganizations, stating that 
it has found the availability of bankruptcy as an alternative to a 
merger as creating "especially close judgment calls."49 The Anti-
trust Division does "not view the possibility of a technically suc-
cessful reorganization as an inflexible barrier to invocation of the 
defense, but a consideration to be taken into account in deter-
mining its appropriateness. "110 
In contrast, the FTC regards the possibility of reorganization 
as an essential third part of the failing company doctrine.111 The 
fact is, however, that both alternatives, acquisition and bank-
ruptcy, might be anticompetitive. The courts, the FTC, and the 
Antitrust Division must decide which is preferable. The FTC's 
position seems to ignore the practical problems of reorganization 
as well as the societal impact of business failure if reorganization 
is unsuccessful. 
4. The failing division or subsidiary- Although there are 
few judicial opinions dealing with the failing subsidiary or divi-
sion, the FTC and the Justice Department have taken somewhat 
different approaches to this question, as demonstrated by their 
decisions in three recent controversial acquisitions. The Justice 
Department Merger Guidelines provide that the failing company 
doctrine should apply to a failing division or subsidiary "only in 
the clearest of circumstances. "H The Department acknowledges 
that it is difficult to determine whether or not a division actually 
" Id. at 47 (testimony of Daniel C. Schwartz). 
•• Id. at 37. A recent attempt by a community group to purchase a plant that United 
States Steel Corporation intended to close resulted in litigation when the company re-
fused to negotiate with the group. Local 1330, United States Steel Workers v. United 
States Steel Corp., [1980-2) TRADE CAB. (CCH) 11 63,486 (6th Cir. 1980). 
•• Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 32 (testimony of John Shenefield). 
00 Id. 
01 See, e.g., Retail Credit Co. [1976-79 Transfer Binder) 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 
21,446 (F.T.C. 1978); United States Steel Corp., 81 F.T.C. 629, 653 (1972); Papercraft 
Corp., 78 F.T.C. 1352, 1406-08 (1971); Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 47 
(testimony of Daniel C. Schwartz). 
•• [1977] 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 4510. 
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is failing. In making that evaluation, it claims to consider the 
financial condition of the parent corporation as wen,u although 
in practice it appears that it decides only whether the parent 
actually intends to close the division or subsidiary.M Thus, the 
Antitrust Division decided not to challenge the sale of General 
Motors' Frigidaire Division to White Consolidated Industries. 511 
GM had determined that Frigidaire was not producing sufficient 
revenues and decided to convert the Frigidaire plant to truck 
production.68 Faced with GM's decision, the Antitrust Division 
required a search for alternative purchasers, and ultimately per-
mitted the acquisition:17 
The FTC, on the qther hand, has been reluctant to permit 
conglomerates to dispose of subsidiaries that are not producing a 
satisfactory profit. According to the FTC, consolidated financial 
statements make it difficult to determine whether a division is 
failing or whether losses and liabilities are being allocated to the 
division to create the appearance of failure. 118 Thus, the FTC re-
fused to approve either the sale of the Federal Glass Division of 
Federal Paperboard Company to Lancaster Colony Corpora-
tion119 or the sale of American Safety Razor, a Philip Morris sub-
sidiary, to BIC, a French razor manufacturer.60 The FTC be-
aa Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 18 (testimony of John Shenefield). 
"' Id. at 19-20, 33. 
06 Id. at 18; (1979] 910 ANTrrRuST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-27. 
"' Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 18-20 (testimony of John Shenefield). 
•• Id. Senator Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) was critical of the Department's decision because 
he viewed the acquisition as anticompetitive and felt that no adequate search for alter-
native purchasers had been made. Id. at 18-24. The Department also authorized a con-
troversial merger between Ling-Temco-Vought and Lykes, both of which had subsidiar-
ies involved in steel manufacturing. (1978] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 50,381. 
08 Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 50-51 (testimony of Daniel C. 
Schwartz). 
•• The FTC obtained an injunction against the acquisition. FTC v. Lancaster Colony 
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In 1978, Federal Paper Board threatened to 
close Federal Glass, but because the FTC concluded that the division was profitable and 
that an inadequate search had been made for alternative purchasers, it refused to permit 
the sale. Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 50 (testimony of Daniel C. 
Schwartz). The FTC withdrew its complaint only after the plant had closed and alterna-
tive purchasers had rejected the acquisition. Id.; Lancaster Colony Corp., Inc., (1979] 3 
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 21,538 (F.T.C. 1979). During the recent Congressional hear-
ings, Senator Metzenbaum was critical of the FTC's decision, but the FTC defended it 
on the ground that at the time the FTC first disapproved the sale Federal Glass was not 
a failing division. Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 37-41 (testimony of 
Daniel C. Schwartz). 
00 BIC and American Safety Razor (ASR) were the second and third largest manufac-
turers, respectively, in a highly concentrated industry. The FTC felt that ASR was not 
failing and that Philip Morris had not sought alternative purchasers. Failing Company 
Hearings, supra note 40, at 49 (testimony of Daniel C. Schwartz). Philip Morris 
threatened to close ASR and laid off 250 workers, but eventually ASR was purchased by 
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lieves that a conglomerate with a failing subsidiary has three 
alternatives: liquidation, rehabilitation, or acceptance of a lower 
overall profit level.81 The FTC fears that extension of the failing 
company doctrine to failing divisions will mean that "a conglom-
erate . . . can simply write off a line of business, a plant, a work 
force, or a whole community, and can turn its attention else-
where, leaving others to pick up the pieces."82 
The views of the Justice Department and the FTC represent 
two extremes, but neither position is completely acceptable. The 
Justice Department recognizes that a genuinely failing division 
poses a real problem to its parent corporation, which may regard 
the alternatives of a large investment for rehabilitation or con-
tinuing losses as unacceptable. The Justice Department's practi-
cal approach does mean, however, that although a division is not 
failing, if the parent insists on liquidation, the Department will 
acquiesce in an acquisition. The Department requires a failing 
company to prove that it actually is failing, but does not seem to 
require the same showing in the case of a subsidiary. It appears 
that the Department's position concerning the application of the 
failing company doctrine to subsidiaries could be improved by a 
more rigorous examination of the actual financial condition of 
the subsidiary and the prospects of rehabilitation, as well as in-
sistence on compliance with the alternative purchaser require-
ment. In short, the Justice Department should apply the failing 
company doctrine to a failing division as strictly as it applies the 
doctrine to a failing corporation. 
On the other hand, the FTC's apparent insistence that the 
failing company doctrine is inapplicable to a failing division in-
evitably will lead to harsh results, as in the case of Federal 
Glass. A realistic evaluation of the difficult situation faced by a 
parent corporation with a genuinely failing subsidiary should 
temper the FTC's position.88 
ASR's management. Id. at 49-50. 
•• Id. at 51. 
•• Id. at 50-51. In Farm Journal, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 26 (1956), the FTC concluded that the 
failing company doctrine did not permit a publisher to sell an unprofitable publication to 
a competitor when its other publications were profitable. 
•• Professors Areeda and Turner recognize the difficulty of applying the failing com-
pany doctrine to a failing subsidiary or division. IV P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTrrRUBT 
LAW '11 926e at 112 (1980). As they note, a parent can manipulate the capital structure of 
a wholly-owned subsidiary to create the appearance of failure. Id. Nonetheless, they con-
clude that the defense should not necessarily be inapplicable to a failing subsidiary. "It 
would be unfair to force parent companies to absorb losses that independent companies 
can avoid, or to take risks which independent lenders would deem improvident. At the 
least, the parent should be permitted to make a showing that would establish a 'failing 
division.' " Id. 
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C. A Complete Defense or a Balancing Test? 
The courts generally regard the failing company doctrine as a 
complete defense to an action under section 7.64 Because the 
doctrine is interpreted narrowly and applied strictly, few compa-
nies are able to convince the courts that all elements of the de-
fense have been satisfied. Assuming that the burden of proof can 
be met, however, the issue remains whether the defense should 
be absolute or whether the courts should engage in a balancing 
of various interests. 
One suggested absolute approach is that a "flexible per se" ap-
proach be used which adjusts the burden of proving ''no alterna-
tive purchasers" with the probable anticompetitive effect of the 
acquisition.611 Supporters of this approach cite the difficulty of 
balancing various interests, and suggest that under a balancing 
test, the doctrine would be almost impossible to prove. This 
analysis, however, ignores the fact that the courts routinely bal-
ance various interests in antitrust cases. For example, in evalu-
ating vertical trade restraints the courts must weigh the reduc-
tion of intrabrand competition against the enhancement of 
interbrand competition resulting from the restraint.66 While 
such balancing is difficult, it can be achieved through the use of 
expert testimony and sophisticated economic analysis. 
Federal enforcement agencies, on the other hand, do not ap-
pear to treat the failing company doctrine as a complete defense. 
The Justice Department acknowledges that it engages in a bal-
ancing analysis. For example, if anticompetitive impact is mini-
mal, concern about the impact of business failure on the com-
munity may prevail.67 The FTC takes a slightly different view. 
After it has been established that conditions of the defense have 
been fulfilled, the FTC analyzes the potential anticompetitive 
effect of the acquisition in determining whether the acquisition 
is lawful.68 Thus, in United States Steel Corp., although the 
traditional elements of the failing company defense were satis-
.. See generally Laurenza, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Failing Company: 
An Updated Perspective, 65 VA. L. REV. 947 (1979). 
•• Id. at 965. 
"" See notes 140-44 and accompanying text infra. 
•• Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 32 (testimony of John Shenefield). 
88 See, e.g., Retail Credit Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 21,446 (F.T.C. 1978); Paper-
craft Corp., 78 F.T.C. 1352 (1971); United States Steel Corp., 74 F.T.C. 1270, 1280-88 
(1968), remanded on other grounds, 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970), on remand, 81 F.T.C. 
629 (1972); Dean Foods Co., 70 F.T.C. 1146, 1283 (1966), modified, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 
1967). 
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fied, the FTC nonetheless compelled United States Steel to 
divest itself of the acquired company because of a trend toward 
concentration and high barriers to entry in the industry.69 The 
FTC concluded that the anticompetitive effects of the acquisi-
tion were not outweighed by the harms resulting from business 
failure.70 
In the absence of congressional action, the doctrine should re-
main as an absolute defense which few companies can satisfy 
since the defense applies only to otherwise anticompetitive ac-
quisitions. It has long been true that the failing company de-
fense is seldom asserted successfully, but Congress is aware of 
the problem. One of the questions addressed during a recent 
congressional hearing on the defense was whether the defense is 
too difficult to establish. 71 If Congress believes that a less rigid 
test should be used, it certainly is capable of changing the rules. 
D. Observations and Conclusions 
The Supreme Court has described the failing company doc-
trine as a "lesser of two evils" approach.71 The Court has appar-
ently considered the possible threat to competition resulting 
from an acquisition more acceptable than the adverse impact on 
competition and other losses if the company goes out of busi-
ness. The Court has thus preserved the dual rationale for the 
doctrine articulated in International Shoe. These rationales, 
however, may be simpler on their face than they are in fact. 
Even under the failing company doctrine, in the absence of new 
legislation the principal concern of the courts and enforcement 
agencies should remain the acquisition's effect on competition, 
rather than social impact of business failure. The acquisition of 
a failing company by a large competitor may lead to an expan-
sion of single-firm market power and entrenchment. In such cir-
cumstances, even the loss of a competitor through business fail-
ure, with the corresponding increase in concentration, may be 
preferable from the standpoint of preserving competition .. For 
example, the acquisition of even a failing company by a strong 
competitor may further strengthen that competitor's position. 
•• 74 F.T.C. 1270, 1303-4 (1968). 
1
• Id. at 1304. 
71 Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 2. 
71 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974). Although the 
Court did not rely on the failing company doctrine in General Dynamics, it did discuss 
the doctrine at some length. 
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In the absence of serious anticompetitive effect, however, the 
social policy implications of business failure seem an appropriate 
consideration. There have been suggestions that the courts 
should consider social impact regardless of anticompetitive ef-
fect. Congressional debates, for example, emphasize the need to 
protect the interests of stockholders, employees, and the com-
munity in which a failing firm is located.73 Business failure ad-
versely affects many people, including employees, stockholders, 
creditors, and the local governments that lose tax revenues. Em-
ployees and local communities are especially unprotected in the 
event of business failure. As a result, in several cases, employees, 
unions, or local governments have attempted to acquire closed 
plants and failing companies. 74 
In general, both the courts and the federal enforcement agen-
cies appear to approach the problem of the acquisition of a fail-
ing company from the proper perspective. They should continue 
to emphasize the traditional elements of probable failure and no 
alternative purchasers. Unless a company actually is failing, an 
otherwise unlawful acquisition should not be permitted. To de-
cide when a firm is "failing" is somewhat difficult, but discovery 
in litigated actions or pre-enforcement requests for information 
should develop sufficient financial data.711 The premerger notifi-
cation process required by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 197678 presumably facilitates this evaluation 
of potentially unlawful mergers by the FTC and the Antitrust 
Division. 
Similarly, the courts, the FTC, and the Justice Department 
should continue to insist that failing companies attempt to lo-
,. See, e.g., Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearings an H.R. 2734 Before a 
Subcamm. of the Senate Camm. an the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 79-81 (1949 
& 1950); Amending Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act: Hearings an H.R. 515 Before 
Subcomm. No. 2 of the Hause Comm. an the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Seas. 9-12 (1947); 
96 CONG. REc. 16445 (1950) (remarks of Sen. Thye); 96 CONG. REc. 16435 (1950) (re-
marks of Sen. O'Conor); 95 CONG. REc. 11490 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Michener); 95 
CoNG. REc. 11487-88 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Goodwin). 
•• Local 1330, United States Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., (1980-2) 
TRADE CAS. (CCH) 11 63,486 (6th Cir. 1980), involved United States Steel's refusal to 
negotiate to sell a closed plant to such a group. The district court dismissed a complaint 
filed by the disappointed buyers alleging a violation of the Sherman Act and breach of 
contract on the grounds that no contract existed and that the Sherman Act did not ap-
ply. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for additional proceedings to supplement 
the record, although it agreed that the complaint raised novel issues. 
•• The Department of Justice can compel the production of documents at the investi-
gative stage before a complaint has been issued. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1976). 
•• See note 39 supra. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act authorizes both the FTC and the 
Department of Justice to require the parties to a merger to produce various types of 
information concerning the parties and the transaction. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976). 
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cate the least anticompetitive purchaser. Only when it has been 
established that no alternative purchaser can be located should 
a competitor be permitted to acquire a failing company. If a sub-
stantial possibility exists that a failing company can be reorga-
nized successfully, the courts or federal agencies should explore 
that alternative. Again, it may be difficult to determine whether 
reorganization is possible or whether there are no alternative 
purchasers. The burden of proving the lack of alternative pur-
chasers should continue to rest on the failing company. It can 
meet that burden by showing that it made genuine efforts to lo-
cate other purchasers. The FTC takes the correct position when 
it contends that a failing company cannot reject an off er from an 
alternative purchaser simply because the off er is lower than the 
offer made by a competitor. To permit such a rejection would 
relegate protection of competition to secondary importance be-
hind protecting stockholders and others. 
The failing subsidiary or division problem poses difficult is-
sues. As noted above, neither the FTC nor the Antitrust Divi-
sion has found an adequate solution to the problem. They 
should approach the failing subsidiary or division as they ap-
proach the failing company: the parent corporation should be re-
quired to prove both failure and an inability to locate alternative 
purchasers. Because of the difficulty of determining whether a 
subsidiary is failing or merely producing an inadequate profit, 
the emphasis should be on locating the least anticompetitive 
purchaser. 
E. The "General Dynamics" Defense 
In United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,77 the Supreme 
Court concluded that the acquisition of a coal company did not 
violate section 7, despite the fact that the acquisition produced a 
company with a large market share in a concentrated industry. 
One of the factors the Court emphasized was that in this case 
large market share did not accurately reflect the acquired com-
pany's competitive weakness because its coal reserves were ei-
ther depleted or committed under long-term contracts.78 The ac-
quired company's future competitive weakness undermined the 
government's prima facie statistical case. The Court made it 
clear that mere competitive weakness was not sufficient to prove 
the failing company defense because the acquired company was 
" 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
•• Id. at 503-04. 
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both profitable and efficient. Rather, the Court determined that 
the acquisition would not substantially lessen competition.79 The 
Court believed that present combined market shares did not ac-
curately reflect future competitive weakness.80 
In General Dynamics, the Court did not intend to loosen the 
requirements of the failing company doctrine. Indeed, the dicta 
in General Dynamics concerning the failing company doctrine 
emphasizes the traditional elements of the doctrine. The true 
significance of General Dynamics is that the Court made a real-
istic evaluation of the competitive effect of the acquisition of a 
company that was not a strong competitor but was not failing. 
Lower courts have not only accepted, but have even expanded 
the General Dynamics defense. Some of these decisions, how-
ever, reveal a serious misunderstanding of General Dynamics. 
Some decisions have created a quasi-failing company defense for 
companies that are merely faltering. In United States v. Inter-
national Harvester Co.,81 for example, the court held that the 
acquisition did not violate section 7 because the acquired com-
pany did not have sufficient financial resources to compete eff ec-
tively. 82 A similar conclusion was reached in United States v. 
Consolidated Foods Corp., 88 where technological difficulties and · 
limited product variety had resulted in a decline in sales and an 
impaired ability to compete on the part of the acquired 
company. 
Not all decisions, however, have followed the trend begun in 
International Harvester. Some lower courts have applied Gen-
eral Dynamics only in evaluating competitive strengths and 
weaknesses. Thus, in FTC v. National Tea Co.," the Eighth Cir-
cuit applied General Dynamics in concluding that because the 
acquired company was such an ineffective competitor and so 
likely to depart from the market that its present market share 
inaccurately reflected its future competitive position, the merger 
should not be enjoined. Similarly, in United States v. Amax,811 
•• Id. at 507-08. 
"° Id. at 510-11. 
•• 564 F.2d 769, 774 (7th Cir. 1977). 
•• In F & M Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1979), 
the Second Circuit avoided deciding whether to follow United States v. International 
Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977), by concluding that the acquired company 
was an effective competitor. International Harvester was cited favorably in a recent dis-
trict court decision, Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Corp., No. 65-C-1755 (N.D. ill., filed 
July 22, 1980), where the court found that management problems undermined a com-
pany's competitive position. Slip op. at 63-66. 
ea 455 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
" 603 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1979) . 
.. 402 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1975). 
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the defendant argued that its costs were so high that it might be 
forced to leave the market and that, like General Dynamics, it 
lacked access to essential resources. Although the court in Amax 
recognized the validity of the General Dynamics analysis, it con-
cluded that the test was not met, particularly because, even 
under defendant's assumed facts, the merger would result in an 
unlawfully large market share. 
The judicial expansion of General Dynamics in cases such as 
International Harvester has been roundly criticized. The Anti-
trust Division, for example, believes that International Har-
vester is "a misapprehension of appropriate antitrust law."88 
Then-Assistant Attorney General Shenefield testified before a 
Senate Subcommittee that the Division will not be receptive to 
claims of "financial weakness."87 In a recent decision,88 the FTC 
expressly refused to follow International Harvester. 89 The FTC 
correctly contends that the Supreme Court's decision in General 
Dynamics did not create a new defense, but merely emphasized 
that consideration should be given to the probable competitive 
effect of the acquisition.90 This appears to be a correct interpre-
tation of General Dynamics. Although some companies are at-
tempting to use International Harvester to expand General Dy-
.. Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 25 (testimony of John Shenefield). 
•• Id. at 34 . 
.. In re Pillsbury Co., (1976-79 Transfer Binder] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 'II 21,710 
(F.T.C. 1979). 
" Commissioner Pitofsky wrote: 
Inclusion of financial weakness as a separate factor or defense-other than in a 
failing company situation, of course-raises serious antitrust policy problems. 
First, there may be a sort of double counting in that financial weaknesses may 
already be reflected in a market share of the troubled company that is lower 
than it would have been but for the financial problems. Second, the issue of 
financial weakness is extremely difficult to handle in court, and susceptible to 
invented claims and vague expert testimony generating factual issues that the 
courts are not well equipped to measure. Third, if all sorts of company "weak-
nesses" or structural market changes operating to the disadvantage of particular 
companies, can overcome a prima facie case of illegality, then the whole valuable 
trend in merger enforcement toward streamlining cases by concentrating on 
properly measured market shares and concentration ratios will be undermined. 
This is not to say that in a close case, financial weakness cannot be taken into 
account along with many other factors in predicting the market consequences of 
a merger, but rather that there ought not be a broad "General Dynamics" de-
fense that may be relied upon to overcome clear instances of illegality based on 
market shares and concentration ratios. 
Id. at '1121,709. Accord, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., (1976-79 Transfer Binder] 3 
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 'II 21,578 (F.T.C. 1979); Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 246, 
289-90 (1977), a/f'd mem., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 'II 21,566 (4th Cir. 1979). 
"' Failing Company Hearings, supra note 40, at 52 (testimony of Daniel C. Schwartz). 
According to Schwartz, between five and eight firms a year unsuccessfully ask the FTC 
to accept a General Dynamics defense. Id. · 
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namics and the failing company doctrine, the FTC intends to 
resist these efforts.91 The FTC is particularly concerned that 
under General Dynamics the acquired company need not search 
for other, less anticompetitive purchasers.92 Although the FTC 
generally seems to understand General Dynamics, its concern 
about alternative purchasers seems inapposite because the focus 
of General Dynamics is that competitive weakness may result in 
an acquisition that does not substantially lessen competition. 
The alternative purchaser issue is relevant to the failing com-
pany doctrine, not to the analysis required by General Dynam-
ics. Finally, Professors Areeda and Turner have voiced similar 
concerns. They believe that General Dynamics simply involved 
"determining the proper measure of past market shares."98 They 
note that in International Harvester it was not evident that 
financial difficulties would lead necessarily to a decline in mar-
ket power.94 
In general, the criticisms of attempts to· expand the General 
Dynamics defense are well-founded. The Supreme Court did not 
intend to create a new defense or to modify the failing company 
doctrine. It merely held that the courts must realistically evalu-
ate competitive strength. Thus, the decisions in Amax, National 
Tea, and Pillsbury appear to have applied the proper standard. 
In International Harvester, on the other hand, the acquired 
company lacked only financial resources, which it presumably 
could have obtained through other less anticompetitive means. A 
simple infusion of capital would have rehabilitated the company. 
Moreover, unlike General Dynamics, the court in International 
Harvester made no attempt to evaluate future competitive effec-
tiveness. There may be instances, such as in National Tea, 
where financial and other difficulties seriously undermine com-
petitive ability. In such cases the requirements of the failing 
company doctrine may not be satisfied. Nonetheless, the acquisi-
tion may not be anticompetitive because without the merger the 
acquired company lacked the means to compete effectively al-
though it could have survived. 
Because both the FTC and the Antitrust Division are hostile 
to attempts to expand General Dynamics, that decision will 
have little practical effect at the pre-enforcement stage. Indeed, 
both agencies presumably will challenge acquisitions in which 
•• Id. at 53. 
H Id . 
.. IV P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTrrauST LAw 11 934a at 134 (1980). 
"' Id. 11 935b at 140-41. Accord, Note, Horizontal Mergers After United States v. Gen-
eral Dynamics, 92 HARV. L. REv. 491, 509-11 (1978). 
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the defense is asserted. Thus, in pre-enforcement proceedings 
merging companies probably will have to meet the more strin-
gent requirements of the traditional failing company doctrine. 
The courts, however, have shown greater willingness to consider 
a General Dynamics defense, although some have misapplied it. 
II. THE FAILING COMPANY DOCTRINE UNDER SECTION 1 
The failing company exemption from section 7 is well estab-
lished, having emerged over 50 years ago. Many judicial deci-
sions, as well as legal scholars, have analyzed the doctrine. How-
ever, the financial condition of a competitor may be relevant to 
alleged violations of other provisions of the antitrust laws as 
well, such as section 1 of the Sherman Act.96 Unlike the failing 
company exemption from section 7, this is a new and relatively 
uncharted area. Few decisions have discussed the effect of 
financial failure on an alleged section 1 violation. Nonetheless, 
there is reason to believe that financial difficulties are an appro-
priate matter for courts to consider in analyzing section 1 cases 
as well. 
A. The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Test 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "every contract 
. . in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be ille-
gal . . . . "96 The courts soon recognized, however, that a literal 
approach to antitrust issues was inappropriate. Under such an 
approach section 1 would invalidate all contracts because, as 
Justice Brandeis noted, "[e]very agreement concerning trade, 
every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of 
their very essence."97 As a result, in Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States,98 the Supreme Court concluded that section 1 should be 
interpreted to prohibit only "unreasonable" restraints.99 
•• 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1976) . 
.. Id. 
07 Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The Supreme 
Court arguably first applied the rule of reason in United States v. Trans Missouri 
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
•• 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
" Id. at 58. Justice Brandeis' opinion in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 
which involved a challenge to a commodity exchange rule designed to create an orderly 
market, contains the classic formulation of the rule of reason. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may 
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In contrast, certain restraints, such as price fixing and other 
horizontal restraints, are regarded as so inherently damaging to 
competition that they have been classified as per se unreasona-
ble.100 The courts presume that the only purpose that could un-
derlie such restraints is the elimination of competition.101 The 
use of the per se standard simplifies the trial court's task. Al-
though the rule of reason requires a detailed inquiry into the 
history, purpose, and effect of the restraint, the per se standard 
completely forecloses such analysis. 102 A per se test, however, is 
somewhat rigid, making it difficult for lower courts to uphold a 
practice that arguably falls within one of the per se categories, 
but nonetheless seems reasonable on its face. 103 
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court 
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint 
is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of 
the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the 
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose 
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good 
intention will save an otherwise objectional regulation or the reverse; but be-
cause knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict 
consequences. 
Id. at 238. Thus, the rule of reason requires an analysis of the industry, the nature of the 
defendant's business, the history of the restraint, the reasons why that restraint was 
imposed, and the effect of the restraint. National Soc. of Prof. Engrs. v. United States, 
435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
100 See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 1925 (1980) (per curiam) 
(price fixing); United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (horizontal 
market division); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (resale price maintenance); 
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycotts); Northern 
Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangements); Timken Roller 
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (horizontal market division); Interna-
tional Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangements); United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price-fixing). The Court first found that 
certain violations are so unreasonable that they cannot be justified in United States v. 
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). The Court first expressly applied the per se 
test in Socony-Vacuum, supra. 
101 As the Court stated in Northern Pacific, certain agreements "because of their per-
nicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed 
to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm 
they have caused or the business excuse for their use." 356 U.S. at 5 (1958). In United 
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927), the Court first used a per se 
analysis, without using the term "per se." 
10
• Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958). 
10
• A good example is the Supreme Court's recent decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The Court of Appeals, feeling 
constrained by the sweeping language of decisions holding that any agreement tending to 
raise, lower, stabilize, or otherwise affect price constitutes unlawful price fixing, held that 
blanket licensing of music was a per se violation of section 1. 562 F.2d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 
1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The Second Circuit recognized the practical difficulties in 
licensing music in any other way, but nonetheless found that the practice was unlawful. 
The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the blanket license was not a naked re-
straint with no purpose except eliminating competition because individual licenses were 
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B. Horizontal Restraints: The Effect of Financial Difficulties 
In only one case, Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 104 
has a court considered economic difficulties in a case involving a 
horizontal restraint. The Supreme Court held that the conduct 
at issue did not violate section 1 because of the economic diffi-
culties faced by defendants. The focus of the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Appalachian Coals was not the financial condition of 
a single competitor but, rather, the condition of an entire indus-
try. Nonetheless, Appalachian Coals represents a major foray by 
the Supreme Court into consideration of a section 1 defendant's 
economic well-being and, therefore, deserves further discussion. 
The defendants were 137 producers of coal in Appalachia who 
had formed a joint exclusive agency to sell their coal. The agent 
established standard product classifications and sold coal at 
prices fixed by the agent's officers.1011 The Government chal-
lenged the arrangement because of its tendency to stabilize the 
price of defendants' coal. Defendants claimed that the joint sales 
agency was necessary to achieve marketing economies and to 
eliminate destructive trade practices. They particularly empha-
sized the depressed economic condition of the coal industry; in 
Appalachia, many coal companies were forced into bankruptcy 
or receivership, while others simply closed mines. 
Ignoring the obvious price fixing implications of the joint sales 
agency, Chief Justice Hughes' opinion assumed that the appro-
priate standard to be applied was whether the joint sales agency 
was "reasonable."106 Significantly, Hughes focused on the eco-
a virtual impossibility. 441 U.S. at 20. The Court noted that "easy labels do not always 
supply ready answers," id. at 8, and that "[l]iteralness is overly simplistic and often 
overbroad." Id. at 9. Justice Stevens' dissent agreed that a per se analysis was inappro-
priate, but argued that the blanket license could be held unreasonable on the record 
before the Court. Id. at 25-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting). On remand, the Second Circuit 
upheld the blanket license under the rule of reason. 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Mar. 2, 1981) (No. 80-323). 
104 288 U.S. 344 (1933). 
••• Id. at 356-58. During World War I, coal production capacity was expanded to meet 
a temporary increase in demand. After the War, there was surplus coal production and 
excess capacity. Moreover, substitute energy forms, such as oil, natural gas, and electric-
ity, were competing with coal and claiming a large share of the energy market. An addi-
tional factor that received little attention in the Court's opinion, but which probably 
exacerbated the problem, was the general depression that began in 1929. As industrial 
output declined, demand for raw materials, such as coal, necessarily declined as well. 
106 As discussed at notes 98-99 and accompanying text supra, in 1911 the Supreme 
Court held that only "unreasonable" restraints of trade violated § 1. However, in United 
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), the Court held that price-fixing 
agreements are "in themselves unrell!l_9nable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity 
of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed 
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nomic distress of the coal industry in assessing reasonable-
ness.107 He accepted defendants' claims concerning the de-
pressed condition of the coal industry. 108 Hughes stressed "the 
evils at which defendants' plan was aimed," asserting that the 
joint sales agency was "an honest effort to remove abuses" and 
would eventually promote the interests of commerce. 109 
In restrospect, the Court's decision in Appalachian Coals 
seems extraordinary. 110 The district court correctly found that 
the joint sales agency necessarily eliminated competition among 
the 137 participants and that the sales price of their coal was 
stabilized. The fact that other coal companies competed with de-
fendants should not have been significant. The Court has held 
on several subsequent occasions that the presence of some com-
petition is irrelevant if competition is restricted in part of the 
market.m The desperate condition of the Appalachian coal in-
.... " Id. at 397. 
107 Chief Justice Hughes wrote: 
It is therefore necessary in this instance to consider the economic conditions 
peculiar to the coal industry, the practices which have obtained, the nature of 
defendants' plan of marketing sales, the reasons which led to its adoption, and 
the probable consequences of carrying out that plan in relation to market prices 
and other matters affecting the public interest in interstate commerce in bitumi-
nous coal. 
Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 361. 
108 Id. at 372. The district court's opinion also recognized the special problems facing 
the coal industry, but, nonetheless concluded that the effect of defendants' practices was 
to raise prices to a level higher than the competitive price. 1 F. Supp. 339 (D. W. Va. 
1932), rev'd, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). The district court entered an order enjoining defen-
dants from utilizing a joint sales agency. 1 F. Supp. at 347-49. 
109 288 U.S. at 372. The district court had found that the joint sales agency necessarily 
would eliminate competition among defendants themselves. 1 F. Supp. at 348. The Su-
preme Court, however, glossed over that finding; because defendants faced competition 
from other producers, "the selling agency will not be able, we think, to fix the market 
price of coal." 288 U.S. at 373. 
The evidence leaves no doubt of the existence of the evils at which defendants' 
plan was aimed. The industry was in distress. It suffered from overexpansion 
and from a serious relative decline through the growing use of substitute fuels. It 
was afflicted by injurious practices within itself - practices which demanded 
correction. If evil conditions could not be entirely cured, they at least might be 
alleviated. The unfortunate state of the industry would not justify any attempt 
unduly to restrain competition or to monopolize, but the existing situation 
prompted defendan°ts to make, and the statute did not preclude them from mak-
ing, an honest effort to remove abuses, to make competition fairer, and thus to 
promote the essential interests of commerce. 
Id. at 372. 
11
• In 1958, the Fourth Circuit examined a similar joint selling agency and found that, 
notwithstanding Appalachian Coals, it constituted a per se violation of § 1. Virginia 
Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958). The court indicated that Ap-
palachian Coals "has not survived the strong and consistent course of subsequent deci-
sion." Id. at 540-51. 
111 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); United 
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dustry, and perhaps the nation's general depression, must have 
influenced the Supreme Court's decision. Although Appalachian 
Coals has little precedential value,111 the case is of interest be-
cause it indicates the extent to which the courts may be willing 
to allow depressed economic conditions to influence their deci-
sions, even in the most egregious cases of price-fixing. As such, it 
represents a high-water mark in the Court's consideration of ec-
onomic distress in section 1 cases. Although the Court is unlikely 
to take such an extreme position in a future horizontal restraint 
case, Appalachian Coals still stands as precedent for renewed 
consideration of this defense. 
C. Vertical Restraints: The Effect of Financial Difficulties 
Non-price vertical restraints118 have had a somewhat tortuous 
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-26 (1940). 
11
• Six years before Appalachian Coals, the Supreme Court had held a price-fixing 
agreement unreasonable without the necessity of a detailed inquiry into the reasonable-
ness of the prices fixed. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 
(1927). The Court in Appalachian Coals simply ignored this precedent. Only seven years 
later, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), the Court re-
viewed an arrangement which had the tendency to raise and stabilize the price of gaso-
line, but was claimed to be necessary to eliminate a "competitive evil." Justice Douglas' 
opinion rejected defendants' arguments concerning "destructive competition" and their 
attempted reliance on Appalachian Coals on the grounds that in that case the joint sales 
agency did not involve price fixing and because of the plight of the coal industry. The 
Court in Socony-Vacuum held that "a combination formed for the purpose and 'with the 
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in 
interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." Id. at 223. 
Justice Douglas' initial basis for distinguishing Appalachian Coals seems inaccurate 
because the joint selling agency fixed the price at which 137 producers sold coal. Appar-
ently the second ground, i.e., the economic condition of the coal industry, was the real 
distinction. The Court in Appalachian Coals used economic difficulties to justify the 
--!lPPlication of the rule of reason rather than a per se test. In Socony-Vacuum, however, 
the Court rejected similar arguments concerning financial difficulties. The Court in-
Socony- Vacuum thus limited Appalachian Coals to its facts. This failure to follow Ap-
palachian Coals so soon after it was decided indicates that the Supreme Court's applica-
tion in that case of the rule of reason to a price fixing conspiracy was an aberration. 
11
• Generally, the rule of reason is applied to vertical arrangements, i.e., agreements 
between a manufacturer and its distributors, suppliers and manufacturers, or wholesalers 
and retailers, rather than to horizontal agreements between competitors. Thus, it is in 
the area of vertical restraints that the courts have been able to consider such factors as 
the economic condition of the entity imposing the restraint. The exception is resale price 
maintenance, a vertical restraint which constitutes a per se violation of § 1. See, e.g., 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977) (dicta); Albrecht 
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 
U.S. 373 (1911). Indeed, the Department of Justice recently instituted the first criminal 
felony prosecution of resale price maintenance. United States v. Cuisinarts, Inc., Crim. 
No. H-80-49 (D. Conn., filed Sept. 17, 1980). On December 19, 1980, Cuisinarts entered a 
nolo contendere plea and was fined $250,000. (1979-80 Transfer Binder] 4 TRADE REG. 
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history in the courts. The Supreme Court's approach to such re-
straints _has come full-circle in less than fifteen years. P_rior to 
1963, the Supreme Court had nev~r even considered a non-price 
vertical restraint. Several major vertical restraint cases decided 
thereafter present interesting implications for the failing com-
pany defense under section 1. 
In the first litigated case involving non-price vertical re-
straints, White Motor Co. v. United States, 114 the Government 
asked the Supreme Court to affirm a district court decision hold-
ing that a manufacturer's arrangement restricting the territory 
of its dealers was per se illegal.116 The defendant in White Motor 
was not a failing company, but in dictum the Court analogized 
to the "failing company doctrine" and noted that in such in-
stances a merger that would otherwise off end the antitrust laws 
may be given immunity, implying that business failure might 
immunize an otherwise unlawful vertical restraint.116 
In the wake of White Motor, the FTC challenged vertical ter-
ritorial restraints under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act in Bandura Co. v. Federal Trade Commission. 117 
Sandura was a small floor covering manufacturer that suffered 
several product failures which nearly forced it into bankruptcy. 
Its market share was declining in an industry dominated by 
large firms, and it had difficulty attracting new distributors. The 
FTC attacked Sandura's policy of assigning its distributors ex-
clusive territories and requiring its distributors to sell only to 
retailers. The FTC considered Sandura's marginal position, but 
concluded that because it was not a failing company, it could not 
justify its use of vertical restraints. 118 The FTC found that for-
bidding distributors from selling in each other's territory re-
REP. (CCH) ,r 45,080. Certain commentators, however, have questioned the continuing 
validity of the per se status of resale price maintenance. See, e.g., Posner, The Rule of 
Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 7-10 (1977); Note, Sylvania and Vertical Restraints on Distribution, 19 B.C.L. 
REV. 751, 769-71 (1978). The commentators have suggested that resale price maintenanc,e 
may promote interbrand competition by encouraging dealers to provide pre-sale services. 
'" 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
110 The district court in White Motor had made such a finding. 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. 
Ohio 1961), rev'd, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); See also ABA ANTITRUST LAW SECTION, VERTICAL 
RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND CoMPETmON 7-8 (Monograph No. 2 1977). Because 
White Motor was the first vertical territorial restraint case to reach ·the Supreme Court, 
it refused to apply a per se test. 372 U.S. at 261, 263. 
11
• 372 U.S. at 263-64. 
117 In re Sandura Co., 61 F.T.C. 756 (1962), rev'd, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964). Section 
5 provides in pertinent part "[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 
45(a)(l) (1976). 
111 61 F.T.C. at 809-16. 
254 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 14:2 
strained competition among them and held that the vertical ter-
ritorial restraints imposed by Sandura was an "unfair method of 
competition" under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.119 
The Sixth Circuit reversed.120 Making it clear that it was using 
a rule of reason approach121 and relying on White Motor, 122 the 
court held that Sandura's territorial restrictions were justified.128 
The court emphasized Sandura's faltering financial condition 
ap.d marginal competitive status12• in holding that Sandura 
would have been unable to market its products successfully in 
the absence of its closed territories policy.136 The result would 
have been a decline in interbrand competition, because Sandura 
would have ceased competition with other manufacturers. 128 
Only four years after it declined to find that vertical territorial 
restraints were per se unlawful in White Motor, the Supreme 
Court adopted a per se rule for vertical territorial restraints in 
United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co.127 In adopting a per se 
110 Id. at 809. 
'"° 339 F.2d at 858-59. 
111 Id. at 849. 
10
• Id. at 853-54. 
113 Id. at 857 . 
... Id. at 851-53. The court agreed with the FI'C that Sandura was not a "failing com-
pany." Id. at 855-56. 
m Id. at 857. 
'"" Id. A similar conclusion was reached in Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FI'C, 321 F.2d 825 
(7th Cir. 1963), which involved a small manufacturer in a highly competitive industry. 
The court accepted Snap-On's claim that territorial restraints were necessary to limit 
dealer turnover. Id. at 831-32. 
m 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Schwinn had adopted its distribution plan, which assigned 
dealers to specific territories and barred them from acting as wholesalers, when Schwinn 
was the nation's largest bicycle manufacturer. Id. 368, 370-71. Justice Fortas noted that 
Schwinn therefore did not fall within the failing company example used in White Motor. 
Id. at 374. Although the opinion noted that the Court should focus on the competitive 
effect of the restraint, id. at 374, 379-80, no detailed economic analysis was used. In fact, 
Justice Stewart's opinion notes that the Court has adopted a per se rule without consid-
ering the "function, purpose or effect" of the restraint. 388 U.S. at 388 (Stewart, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stewart noted that the district court 
had found that Schwinn's distribution restraints enhanced competition. Id. at 386. He 
was particularly critical of the Court for adopting a per se rule only four years after 
concluding in White Motor that it lacked sufficient experience with non-price vertical 
restraints to use a per se test. Id. at 389. Instead, the Court assumed that such restraints 
were anticompetitive when the manufacturer sold the product to a distributor: "Under 
the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict 
and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer 
has parted with dominion over it." Id. at 379. 
Although the Government had not argued for a per se rule, id. at 373, the Court none-
theless adopted one and declined to follow its earlier decision in White Motor that it did 
not know enough about the competitive effect of vertical restraints to hold them unrea-
sonable on their face. The Government had argued that vertical restrictions should be 
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rule, however, the Schwinn Court referred to the "failing com-
pany" example used in White Motor, and thereby preserved an 
exception to its new per se test: vertical restrictions might be 
justifiable if imposed by a manufacturer who would be unable to 
compete without them. Several lower courts recognized the va-
lidity of the failing company justification in dicta. uis Even the 
Department of Justice indicated that that Schwinn left some 
room for special economic justifications of vertical restraints: 
The law as it stands does not, it seems to us, bar all con-
sideration of special economic justification for territorial 
restraints. First of all, the cases establishing so-called per 
se rules against exclusive territory agreements, Schwinn 
· and Topco, appear to leave room for exceptions. The 
Court in Schwinn mentioned "possible factors" which 
might "shelter" vertical restraints from the per se rule. 
The Court said that in the Schwinn Company's own con-
text the territory and customer restrictions were "unrea-
sonable without more" (emphasis added). What "more" 
might suffice was not fully explained, but the Court did 
note its White Motor Co. decision, in which the existence 
of a failing company or a newcomer seeking to break into 
a market were mentioned as possible justifications for 
territorial agreements. 119 
Nonetheless, no court actually relied on a manufacturer's fal-
tering economic condition in upholding non-price vertical re-
presumed illegal unless the manufacturer could justify the restraint. See Posner, The 
Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 
U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1977) (Professor Posner argued Schwinn for the United States). 
, .. See Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934, 945 (5th Cir. 1975); 
Ammerman v. Bestline Products, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1077, 1080 (E.D. Wis. 1973). 
Dissatisfaction with Schwinn led lower courts to develop several exceptions to the per 
se rule, including: health and safety, e.g., Tripoli Co., Inc. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); exclusive distributorships imposed unilater-
ally, e.g., Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); or restrictions that were not enforced, e.g., Janel Sales Corp. 
v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968). See 
generally ABA ANTrrauBT LAW SECTION, VERTICAL REsTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND 
COMPETITION 14-20 (Monograph No. 2 1977); Note, Exceptions to Schwinn's Per Se 
Rule: Their Validity and Implications for the Future, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 643 
(1974). 
'" Proposed Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce on Exclusive Territorial Franchises, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1975); accord, 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce on Exclusive Territorial Franchise Act, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 18 (1974). . 
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straints until GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T. V., Jnc.180 
Sylvania, a subsidiary of General Telephone & Electric Co., 
manufactured televisions. The domestic television industry was 
dominated by two giants, RCA and Zenith, and Sylvania found 
itself unable to compete. In 1962, with a market share of approx-
imately one or two percent, Sylvania instituted a selective distri-
bution system designed to develop aggressive, effective deal-
ers. 181 Continental, a former Sylvania dealer, alleged that 
Sylvania's location restriction constituted a per se violation of 
section l.182 The trial court instructed the jury that it could not 
consider the reasonableness of Sylvania's location clause. Rely-
ing on Schwinn, the court rejected a proposed Sylvania instruc-
tion that would have allowed a finding of a violation only if the 
location clause unreasonably restrained competition.133 The dis-
trict judge also rejected a proposed Sylvania "failing company" 
instruction to the effect that the location clause was reasonable 
if it enabled Sylvania to remain in the industry or to compete 
effectively.134 Not surprisingly, the jury returned a verdict for 
Continental.136 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court 
erred in rejecting Sylvania's proposed rule of reason instruc-
tions. 136 The court distinguished Schwinn based on the size and 
uo 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
m 537 F.2d at 984. Sylvania dealers were authorized to sell Sylvania products only at 
designated locations and were unable to move Sylvania merchandise to a new location 
without prior approval. No dealer was given an exclusive territory, however, and no 
dealer was able to veto the establishment of a new dealer in its market. Through the use 
of this new distribution system, Sylvania's market share increased to approximately five 
percent, making it the eighth largest domestic television manufacturer. 
Continental T.V. was a successful Sylvania dealer in Northern California. When Sylva-
nia franchised a new dealer near one of Continental's stores, Continental objected and 
reduced its orders from Sylvania. In 1965, Continental opened a new store in Sacramento 
and sought Sylvania's approval to sell there, but Sylvania denied the request. When 
Continental ignored Sylvania's refusal and sold Sylvania merchandise in Sacramento, 
Sylvania terminated Continental's franchise and Sylvania's finance company sued Conti-
nental for unrepaid loans. Continental counterclaimed alleging a violation of § 1. 
13
• 537 F.2d at 985. 
m Id. at 987. The trial court judge was Associate Justice Tom C. Clark (Ret.), sitting 
by designation. Id. at 987 n.10. Justice Clark had dissented in White Motor and argued 
for a per se rule invalidating all vertical restraints. White Motor Co. v. United States, 
372 U.S. 253, 275-83 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
n• 537 F.2d at 987. 
13
• Id. at 986. 
136 Id. at 988. The Ninth.Circuit distinguished Schwinn on its facts because Schwinn's 
territorial restrictions required dealers to sell only in their exclusive territories and pre• 
vented dealers from competing for customers outside their territories. Sylvania dealers, 
on the other hand, could advertise in any area and could sell to anyone as long as they 
sold from an approved location. Id. at 989-90. Moreover, Sylvania had at least two deal-
ers in every market. Id. at 990. In separate opinions, Judge Kilkenny and Judge Brown-
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effectiveness of the two manufacturers. 137 Schwinn was the larg-
est domestic bicycle manufacturer, while Sylvania, at the time it 
instituted the location clause, had less than a two percent mar-
ket share. Sylvania's location clause enabled it to grow to a 
respectable five percent market share, thereby permitting it to 
remain in the market as a viable interbrand competitor, while 
preserving some intrabrand competition.138 Although the Ninth 
Circuit found it unnecessary to decide whether the proposed 
"failing company" instruction should have been given, the lan-
guage of the opinion indicates approval of the concept of such 
an instruction: 
[Schwinn] indicates that the [failing company] defense is 
also available in cases wherein a vertical restraint is being 
challenged. The Court in Schwinn clearly indicated its 
intent that the failing company defense, once shown, 
would then subject the case to the rule of reason and the 
per se rule would not be applicable. 139 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Sylvania focused principally 
on two points: the importance of interbrand competition and the 
need to overrule Schwinn. Justice Powell's opinion recognized 
that Schwinn allowed an exception to the per se rule for failing 
companies, 140 but held that "the advantages of vertical restric-
ing disagreed with the majority's efforts to distinguish Schwinn. Id. at 1008-12 
(Kilkenny, J., dissenting); id. at 1021-25 (Browning, J., dissenting). 
117 Id. at 991. 
,aa Id. at 991, 1000-2. The Ninth Circuit relied on Justice Brennan's concurrence in 
White Motor in which he emphasized that some vertical restraints promote competition 
by permitting products to be marketed effectively. Id. at 990-91, citing White Motor Co. 
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 269, 272 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). It also cited an 
FTC report that stated "in Schwinn, the Court left enough leeway in its initial threshold 
test of the overall reasonablene88 of vertical arrangements to enable a manufacturer to 
justify such an arrangement by establishing that it could not have entered the market or 
expanded its market share .... " 527 F.2d at 996-97, citing FTC, REPORT OF An Hoc 
COMM. ON FRANCHISING 30 (1969). 
••• 537 F.2d at 1004 n.41. 
"° Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 353-54 n.22 (1977). The 
Supeme Court chose to use Sylvania to reconsider Schwinn. Justice Powell noted that in 
White Motor, decided only four years before Schwinn, the Court refused to adopt a per 
se test. Id. at 47. Powell's opinion utilized the detailed economic analysis that Schwinn 
had endorsed but not applied. See also United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 
U.S. 486 (1974), and United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969), where the 
Court also emphasized the importance of detailed economic analysis. While recognizing 
that vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand competition, Jusiice Powell chose to empha-
size the primary importance of interbrand competition and noted that vertical restraints 
can promote efficiencies and &ggre88ive marketing. 433 U.S. at 54-55. The marketing effi-
ciencies recognized by the Court included: inducing retailers to make the investments 
necessary to permit manufacturers to enter new markets, encouraging retailers to pro-
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tions should not be limited to the categories of new entrants and 
failing firms. Sylvania was faltering, if not failing, and w~ think 
it would be unduly artificial to deny it the use of valuable com-
petitive tools."141 Thus, the Court acknowledged the special 
problems of failing companies, but also concluded that many 
companies, even those that are successful, may compete more 
effectively by imposing vertical restraints. As a result, the Court 
overruled Schwinn• and returned to a rule of reason analysis of 
non-price vertical restraints.141 
The Court could have stressed the failing company aspect of 
Sylvania to a greater degree. Justice White, in an opinion con-
curring in the judgment, argued that by relying on the language 
in Schwinn concerning failing companies, the Court could have 
upheld Sylvania's marketing restraints by "refusing to extend 
Schwinn to a vertical restraint that is imposed by a 'faltering' 
manufacturer with a 'precarious' position in a generic product 
market dominated by another firm."148 Sylvania's faltering con-
dition had been part of the Ninth Circuit's basis for distinguish-
ing Schwinn. The fact that the Court failed to adopt Justice 
White's argument suggests that the Court was looking for an op-
portunity to overrule Schwinn. Justice Powell's majority opinion 
cited the criticism of Schwinn by both lower courts and legal 
scholars. 144 This criticism, together with the Court's new empha-
sis on the importance of economic analysis, may have led to the 
decision to overrule rather than distinguish Schwinn. 
Nonetheless, on remand, the district court relied principally 
on Sylvania's faltering financial status at the time the restraint 
was imposed in granting Sylvania's motion for summary judg-
ment. H& The court stated that "prior to 1965, defendant was a 
vide product service and repair facilities, encouraging retailer promotion, eliminating 
"free-rider" distributors who provided no services to customers, limiting product liability 
problems, and compliance with federal laws concerning product safety and warranties. 
Id. at 54-55 & n.23. 
1° Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. at 58 n.29. 
••• Id. at 57-59. The Court left open the possibility that certain vertical restraints 
might be illegal per se provided that such a finding was "based upon demonstrable eco-
nomic effect rather than - as in Schwinn - upon formalistic line drawing." Id. at 58-
59. 
148 Justice White's concurring opinion agreed with the Ninth Circuit that Schwinn 
could be distinguished on the grounds that Sylvania's location clause imposed fewer re-
strictions on retailers. 433 U.S. at 59-61 (White, J., concurring). He also agreed that Syl-
vania's status as a faltering competitor with a small market share brought it within the 
exceptions to the per se rule for failing companies suggested in Schwinn. Id . . at 64-65. 
144 433 U.S. at 47-48 and nn.13, 14 . 
... Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D. Cal. 1978), 
appeal docketed, No. 79-4131 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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'faltering, if not a failing,' firm in the television industry," and 
that Continental had become an effective interbrand competi-
tor148 by implementing vertical territorial restrictions. m Thus, 
the failing company aspect of Sylvania did not go unnoticed. 148 
The failing company defense in vertical restraint cases has 
been considered elsewhere, as well. In Beltone Electronics 
Corp., 149 an FTC administrative law judge rejected a hearing aid 
. manufacturer's claim that its "faltering" company status justi-
fied its assignment of exclusive territories to its dealers, which 
was found to limit both intrabrand and interbrand competi-
tion. 160 The administrative law judge discounted Beltone's show-
ing that its sales and market share had declined and that it had 
sustained operating losses in recent years, because, among other 
factors, it remained the largest domestic hearing aid manufac-
turer.1151 He found that its sales decline and losses could be due 
to non-competitive factors. m 
Although no other recent cases consider the effect of a manu-
facturer's failing condition on a rule of reason analysis of vertical 
restrictions, the Department of Justice's enforcement policy 
takes a competitor's financial condition into consideration. Rich-
ard J. Favretto, Deputy Director of Operations of the Antitrust 
Division, identified three factors that the Department will con-
sider in deciding whether to challenge non-price vertical re-
,., Id. at 1052. 
••• The conclusion that its restricted marketing program made Sylvania an effective 
competitor may have been premature. GTE has announced its intention to sell its televi-
sion business, including both Sylvania and Philco. Wall St. J., Oct. 3, 1980, at 4, col. 2; 
GTE's president commented, "we aren't viable in the marketplace as a competitor and 
we're prepared to exit the business if this doesn't go through." Id. 
148 Balancing the benefits to interbrand competition against the damage to intrabrand 
competition presumably will be achieved through expert economic testimony and analy-
sis of the special competitive problems of the industry in question. 
149 Dkt. No. 8928 (F.T.C. filed June 27, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Beltone Initial De-
cision]. In an earlier decision based on Schwinn, Beltone's distribution system had been 
held to violate § 5 of the FTC Act. Beltone Electronics Corp., Dkt. No. 8928 (F.T.C. 
Initial Decision, filed Sept. 7, 1976), summarized in [1976-79 Transfer Binder] TRADE 
REG. REP. (CCH) 1J 21,198. After the Supreme Court overruled Schwinn in Sylvania, the 
FTC remanded the case to the Administrative Law Judge for a thorough examination of 
effects of Beltone's distribution plan on interbrand and intrabrand competition. 91 
F.T.C. 84, 85 (1978). An appeal of the Administrative Law Judge's supplemented Initial 
Decision is pending before the FTC. 
'"
0 Beltone Initial Decision, supra note 149, at 23-28. 
101 From 1972 to 1977, Beltone's market share fell from 21 % to 16%. Id. at 15. During 
the last five years, domestic hearing aid sales, not including Beltone, declined 4.5%, 
while Belton's sales declined 22%. Id. at 13. Beltone sustained operating losses for 1976-
79. Id: The FTC staff claimed that because Beltone was closely-held, it had little pres-
sure to show a profit, and that a large portion of its losses were attributable to excessive 
officers' salaries. 99 FTC: Watch 1-3 (June 27, 1980). 
10
• Beltone Initial Decision, supra note 149, at 26. 
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straints: the market power of the company imposing the re-
straint, the extent to which the restraint impedes intrabrand 
competition, and its justification in terms of enhanced inter-
brand competition.1&3 He also stated: 
I think the Division is not likely to challenge non-price 
vertical restraints being used by new entrants or by mar-
ginal competitors like Sylvania who may be akin to the 
failing company found in merger law. It seems to be gen-
erally accepted among many economists and businessmen 
that vertical restraints can facilitate entry and continued 
market presence of small manufacturers by permitting 
them to secure the services of capable dealers and to 
build a favorable image. This promotes interbrand com-
petition while imposing limitations on intrabrand compe-
tition that are not particularly significant. m 
D. Applying the Failing Company Doctrine in Section 1 
Actions: Problem Areas 
For purposes of section 1, financial difficulties will be relevant 
principally as an element to be considered in applying the rule 
of reason in contrast with the use of the failing company doc-
trine as an affirmative defense in merger litigation. It seems un-
likely that a company can successfully use financial difficulties 
to justify a per se violation. 11111 
The failing company doctrine as applied in section 1 cases, 
however, does bear some resemblance to an affirmative defense, 
raising questions as to allocating the burden of proof. Tradition-
ally the plaintiff in an antitrust case bears the burden of proving 
that certain conduct is unreasonable. The defendant (or respon-
dent in an FTC case), however, presumably would raise the issue 
of financial difficulties in the first instance in an attempt to re-
but such a showing and to justify any restraint it had imposed. 
Thus, in Sandura the respondent established that product fail-
103 Speech given by Richard J. Favretto on May 12, 1978, before the Southwestern 
Legal Foundation Symposium on Antitrust Law in Dallas, Texas, reprinted in 5 TRADE 
REG. REP. (CCH) ,i 50,370 at 55,801. 
, .. Id. at 55,803. 
10
• The Court hinted in Schwinn that the per se rule concerning vertical restraints 
might be inapplicable to a failing company, thus raising the possibility that failing com-
panies might raise the doctrine as a defense to a per se charge. It seems unlikely, how-
ever, that even business failures could justify price-fixing or a tying arrangement. See 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 216 (1940). 
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ures threatened its competitive viability and that territorial re-
straints were necessary to build an effective distribution system. 
Similarly, Sylvania established that it was a "faltering, if not a 
failing, firm,"118 and that its use of vertical restraints permitted 
it to become a real competitor in the television industry.157 In-
formation concerning financial difficulties or other business 
problems is known principally by the defendant company. Pre-
sumably the courts will require the defendant to make whatever 
showing is necessary to establish that its imposition of market-
ing restraints was reasonable. This approach seems more appro-
priate than requiring a plaintiff to establish that the defendant 
is not a failing company as part of its· case. 
The issue then becomes what the defendant company must 
prove. In Sandura the respondent was a small competitor in a 
field dominated by large companies. Its product failures nearly 
forced it into bankruptcy before it began to market a new prod-
uct successfully through the use of territorial restraints on dis-
tributors. The court found that Sandura's position was even 
more precarious than that of a new entrant because it had to 
overcome the reputation of its past product failures. 1118 Sylva-
nia's competitive position was similar to Sandura's - a small 
competitor (between one and two percent of the market) in an 
industry dominated by a large competitor with a 60 percent 
market sh,µ-e. 1119 Sylvania's market share was so small that it was 
threatened with expulsion from t'1e television market.180 Sylva-
nia's limited distribution system enabled it to raise its market 
share to five percent. 161 
Under the failing company defense as applied in merger cases, 
the defendant must prove that the acquired company faced the 
imminent danger of business failure. 161 In Sandura and Sylva-
nia a less rigorous standard was applied: the defendants were 
faltering rather than failing. Thus, a defendant can justify cer-
tain non-price vertical restraints by establishing that it is a mar-
ginal competitor and need not prove that it actually is failing. 
This standard seems appropriate because the principal concern 
, .. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1046, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 
1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-4131 (9th Cir.). 
••• GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 1976), 
aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
108 Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 851 (6th Cir. 1964). 
••• GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 1976), 
aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
""' Id. at 983 n.2. 
"' Id. at 984. 
••• See notes 21-30 and 40-44 and accompanying text supra. 
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under section 1 is interbrand competition. The continued viabil-
ity or strengthening of a marginal competitor promotes inter-
brand competition and may reduce industry concentration, or at 
least prevent increased concentration through the loss of a com-
petitor. Thus, a company with a small share of a concentrated 
market that is experiencing financial difficulties may be allowed 
to impose restraints that would be unlawful if imposed by a 
larger, financially-secure competitor. 
The question arises whether a defendant would lose its 
financial difficulties justification if, as a result of the restraint, it 
became tremendously successful. It is unlikely that such a radi-
cal alteration in competitive strength could occur within even 
the extended period of time required to try an antitrust case. 
But assuming, however, that a defendant's competitive position 
improved significantly, .the courts should not necessarily hold 
any restraints it utilized to become a strong competitor to be 
unreasonable. The restraint might nonetheless promote inter-
brand competition. Moreover, nothing in Sylvania suggests that 
a firm with a significant market share cannot impose non-price 
restraints, provided some legitimate justification exists.168 
E. Interpretation by Federal Enforcement Agencies 
As discussed in Part IB above, the FTC and the Department 
of Justice Antitrust Division have different interpretations of 
the failing company defense in merger actions.164 The testimony 
given by the two federai enforcement agencies before a Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee highlighted those dif-
ferences.1611 Although less evidence exists of the manner in which 
the FTC and Justice Department will deal with a financially-
us Several commentators have suggested that market power may be a basis for finding 
certain vertical restraints to be unlawful. See, e.g., Louis, Vertical Distribution Re-
straints After Sylvania: A Postscript and Comment, 76 MICH. L. REV. 265, 272 (1977); 
Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1978); Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Ap-
proach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1977). In one 
recent case, however, the court upheld territorial restraints imposed by a manufacturer 
with a 70% market share without even discussing the problem of market power. Crowley 
v. Braden Indus., (1980-1) TRADE CAs. 'II 63,134 (9th Cir. 1980). 
In United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), af/'d 
per curiam, 365 U.S. 567, the court permitted a new entrant to utilize an otherwise un-
lawful tying arrangement, but noted that if such restraints were continued beyond the 
time reasonably necessary to protect the new entrant's business interests, they would 
become illegal. 
'
84 See notes 39-70 and accompanying text supra. 
180 See id. 
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troubled company that is charged with a violation of section 1, 
some of the differences that characterized their approaches to 
merger issues may be equally applicable under section 1. 
The FTC generally construes the requirements of the failing 
company defense in merger cases more strictly than does the 
Antitrust Division. On the basis of the FTC's decisions in 
Sandura188 and Beltone, 187 it appears that the FTC is not recep-
tive to claims of financial difficulties. In Sandura the FTC re-
jected Sandura's argument that its marketing restraints were 
justified by its precarious financial condition.188 Similarly, an 
FTC administrative law judge discounted Beltone;s claim that 
its recent marketing losses and declining sales justified the terri-
torial restraints it imposed on dealers.189 These decisions indi-
cate that the FTC is generally skeptical about attempts to jus- . 
tify marketing restraints on grounds of financial difficulties. 
The only evidence to date of the Antitrust Division's position 
on this question is the public statements made by Justice De-
partment officials. In the wake of Schwinn, the Department rec-· 
ognized that although territorial restraints were per se illegal, 
Schwinn left "some room . . . for consideration of the economic 
exigencies of particular situations."170 . In a speech given after 
Sylvania overruled Schwinn, a spokesman for the Antitrust Di-
vision indicated that the Division is not likely to challenge verti-
cal restraints imposed by marginal competitors "who may be 
akin to the failing company found in merger law."171 Thus, the 
Antitrust Division's interpretation of the failing company doc-
trine for purposes of section 1, like its interpretation of the doc-
trine in merger cases, may be less strict than that of the FTC. 
The Antitrust Division's views seem more consistent with both 
the tone of the Supreme Court's decision in Sylvania and the 
competitive realities that the Court indicated should be of pri-
mary importance under the rule of reason. The Supreme Court's 
opinion in Sylvania shows a clear appreciation of the special 
problems confronting a marginal company in a competitive in-
dustry. The Court recognized that vertical restraints may pro-
mote interbrand competition by allowing a marginal competitor 
, .. Sandura Co., 61 F.T.C. 756 (1962), rev'd, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964). 
187 Beltone Electronics Corp., Dkt. No. 8928 (F.T.C. filed June 27, 1980). 
, .. Sandura Co., 61.F.T.C. 756, 809-16 (1962), rev'd, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964). 
••• Beltone Initial Decision, supra note 149, at 23-28. 
170 Hearings on Exclusive Territorial Franchise Act Before the Subcomm. on Com-
merce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d 
Cong., 2d SeSB. 18 (1974) (statement of Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General). 
171 See notes 153-54 and accompanying text supra. 
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to attempt to develop an aggressive, effective distribution 
system. 
Thus the failing company presumably will find it much easier 
to justify marketing restrictions than a successful competitor. 
Failing companies lack the market power that could make verti-
cal restraints imposed by dominant companies seem unreasona-
ble. As in the case of Sylvania or Sandura, vertical restraints 
may permit a manufacturer to remain in the market and per-
haps to become a significant, viable competitor. When faced 
with the alternative of some restriction on intrabrand competi-
tion or the reduction of interbrand competition through the loss 
of a ~ompetitor, the courts should and probably will allow failing 
companies to utilize vertical restraints, perhaps even in circum-
stances where a more successful competitor would not be al-
lowed to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
The continuing controversy surrounding the application of the 
failing company doctrine under section 7 of the Clayton Act, and 
the revitalization of the rule of reason analysis under section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, indicate that the financial condition of a com-
pany charged with violating the antitrust laws will remain a sig-
nificant factor in judicial evaluation of such conduct. In fact, 
there are indications that the courts today are especially con-
scious of the special problems facing a failing company. The 
courts' sympathetic response to the plight of the failing com-
pany seems legitimate and appropriate, provided that the courts 
remain aware that the primary concern of the antitrust laws 
must remain the preservation of competition, not the implemen-
tation of social policy, a matter for Congress, not the courts. The 
courts have recognized that i~ some instances permitting a fail-
ing company to engage in arguably unlawful conduct may pro-
mote rather than restrain competition. The majority of the cases 
in which a company's financial condition has operated as an ex-
ception to the antitrust laws appear to have been decided cor-
rectly. In most such cases, the courts have focused first on the 
competitive effect of the practice, and merely included the de-
fendant's faltering financial condition as one element in that 
analysis. Thus, assuming that they apply the proper standards, 
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the courts can and should give consideration to the economic 
condition of litigants in interpreting the antitrust laws. 

